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Cyberlibel: Workable Liability Standards?
Paul R. Niehaust
For centuries, the' common law torts of slander and libel
allowed individuals to sue for the broadcast and publication of
false and injurious words.' Like other tort actions, a major con-
cern of defamation law is determining who will pay for the
injury. Should liability be limited to the person making the
defamatory statement, or should 'other parties also be liable?
Although the law governing libel always allowed plaintiffs to sue
the defaming individual, the rules governing liability for
disseminators of libelous material differ depending on the legal
status of the disseminator. The various legal classifications carry
differing standards of care that often determine ultimate liability.
While common carriers, such as the phone company, generally
are not liable for defamatory statements transmitted over their
systems, newspapers and magazines are held to a higher stan-
dard of care for information published in their pages.
The advent of computers, cyberspace, and electronic bulletin
boards (BBSs) has created situations which defy the traditional
categories for defamation liability.2 Computer bulletin boards
allow the instant transmission of thoughts and ideas to millions
of potential readers. These transmissions are not the carefully-
considered, polished words of news broadcasters, station manag-
ers, newspaper editors, or network executives, but rather are the
spontaneous thoughts of ordinary people. Nor is their distribution
limited to a single transmission, as are radio and television
broadcasts, since electronically posted messages can linger on
bulletin boards for weeks, continuing distribution to new persons
and dramatically increasing the harm to defamed individuals.
f A.B. 1994, Princeton University; J.D. Candidate 1997, University of Chicago.
Historically, slight differences have existed between the laws of libel (written
defamation) and slander (verbal defamation). The modern trend, however, is to use
similar laws for each under the catch-all term "defamation." See, for example, Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 US 749 (1985).
2 There are approximately 150,000 BBSs in the United States, the majority of which
are run by hobbyists. David J. Conner, Cubby v. CompuServe, Defamation Law on the
Electronic Frontier, 2 Geo Mason Independent L Rev 227, 229 (1993). Regrettably; this
Comment has only enough space to consider BBSs and not other forms of electronic
communication.
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To apply defamation law to the new medium of BBSs, courts
must decide how to classify BBSs for liability purposes. The
simplest, and most tempting, approach may be to squeeze the
new technology into one of the traditional classifications created
for newspapers, telephones, and television. Such an approach,
however, would ignore the new realities created by advanced
technology, force BBSs into an improper classification, and
squander an opportunity to fashion law that makes practical
sense. A more fruitful approach would create a new classification
for BBSs by combining relevant elements from the present
classifications and adjusting them in light of modern public policy
concerns.
I. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT LAW
Currently, individual states draw the specific contours of
defamation law.' Typically, to recover damages for defamation, a
plaintiff must show falsity, ,injury, publication of the statement to
a third party, and failure by the defendant to exercise proper
care.4 if any element is absent or unproven, a suit for damages
fails. In other words, if an allegedly libelous statement is true,
causes no injury to the plaintiff, or is not repeated by the defen-
dant to another party, no cause of action exists. For the purposes
of this comment, it is assumed that the elements of falsity, inju-
ry, and publication have been met. The remaining task is to
determine who the injured party may reach for damages, and
what standard of care a defendant must exercise to escape lia-
bility.
A. Current Classifications
Defamation law generally recognizes three categories of in-
formation distributors and three corresponding standards of care.
Since liability doctrines were fashioned around the traditional
media, it is useful to examine the categories into which tradition-
al media have been placed.
' Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323, 347 (1974) ("We hold that... the States
may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual."). Since defamation
law is state specific, the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1976) will be used to discuss
those provisions of defamation law that are generally accepted among the states.
' Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1976).
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1. Common carriers.
Common carriers are information disseminators who indis-
criminately allow all those able to pay a user fee to transmit orig-
inal messages via their services.5 Phone companies, telegraph
companies, satellite services, and the postal service are examples
of common carriers.'
Common carriers are held to the lowest of the three stan-
dards of care for information disseminators. Actual knowledge of
a statement's defamatory nature prior to transmission is neces-
sary for liability to attach to a common carrier.7 A common carri-
er has no duty to inspect messages or information.' The only
obligation of a common carrier is to prevent transmission of in-
formation known to be defamatory.9 For example, in Western
Union Telegraph Co. v Lesesne, the court held that a telegraph
company would be liable if an employee knew that a libelous
message was about to be sent and failed to prevent the transmis-
sion.1o
The rationale behind such a rule stems from fairness and
efficiency concerns." Any law assigning liability for damages
should allow the parties a mechanism for preventing or minimiz-
ing liability. Given that common carriers presently lack the legal
ability to alter harmful messages prior to transmission, it would
be unfair to hold them liable for damaging messages actually
sent over their services. 2 If common carriers were responsible
for screening all of their messages, efficiency would be seriously
impaired-an issue courts have confronted in the past. 3 Taken
to its (il)logical extreme, such a rule could drive a phone company
to prohibit real-time conversations between individuals, since the
' Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581 comment b (1976). See also National Associa-
tion of Regulatory Utility Commisioners v FCC, 525 F2d 630, 640 (DC Cir 1976), citing 47
USC § 153(h) (1970).
6 See 47 USC § 153(h) (1994) (definition of common carrier); and National Associa-
tion of Regulatory Utility Commisioners v FCC, 533 F2d 601, 608 (DC Cir 1976) (noting
that a quasi-public character distinguishes common carriers).
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 612 comment g (1976).
See, for example, Von Meysenburg v Western Union Telegraph Co., 54 FSupp 100,
101 (SD Fla 1944); Mason v Western Union Telegraph Co., 52 Cal App 3d 429, 438-39, 125
Cal Rptr 53 (1975). In fact, 47 USC § 202(a) (1994) prevents common carriers from moni-
toring or editing the messages they carry.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 612 comment g (1976).
10 Western Union Telegraph Co. v Lesesne, 198 F2d 154 (4th Cir 1952).
" Robert Charles, Computer Bulletin Boards and Defamation: Who Should be Liable?
Under What Standard?, 2 J L & Tech 121, 132 (1987).
1 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 612 comment g (1976).
" See, for example, O'Brien v Western Union Telegraph Co., 113 F2d 539, 541 (1st Cir
1940) and Von Meysenburg, 54 F Supp at 101.
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phone company would have to screen each sentence for potential-
ly defamatory material. Because such a notion is eminently un-
reasonable, the common carrier is not normally liable for defama-
tory statements made by those using its services.
2. Secondary publishers.
Secondary publishers do not originate the material they
disseminate.14 The secondary publisher receives the information
in final form and makes no editorial changes. Newsstands, book-
stores, libraries, and television affiliates are secondary publish-
ers. 1
5
The standard of care for these publishers is that of "knew or
should have known";16 they are held liable only if they knew or
should have known of the defamatory nature of the information
they distribute. 7 Two lines of reasoning animate this standard.
First, as enunciated in Auvil v CBS "60 Minutes", secondary
publishers are held to a "knew or should have known" standard
because distributors have neither the resources nor the expertise
to review all the material they receive."8 Second, such a review
might violate the First Amendment as it would unduly inhibit or
"chill" free speech. 9  Courts have also placed traditional bulle-
tin boards into this category, although the case law is rather
sparse. The court held in Hellar v Bianco that once the controller
of a bulletin board or premises is aware of defamatory material
on the premises, failure to remove the material within a reason-
able time will subject the controller to liability." This standard,
however, attaches only after notice has been given to the owner
of the bulletin board. There is no duty to police the bulletin
board, even if it is foreseeable that defamatory material may be
posted on the board.2'
W. 'Page Keeton, et al, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 113 at 810 (West, 5th ed
1984).
" Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581(1) comments d and e (1976).
16 Id.
17 Id. See also Lerman v Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 521 F Supp 228, 235 (SD NY
1981).
18 Auvil v CBS "60 Minutes", 800 F Supp 928, 931 (ED Wash 1992). This idea will be
discussed further in Part II.
19 See, for example, Smith v California, 361 US 147, 152-55 (1959). For good discus-
sions of the First Amendment issue, see Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law,
69 Colum L Rev 808 (1969); Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment:
Unraveling the "Chilling Effect", 58 BU L Rev 685 (1978).
'0 Hellar v Bianco, 111 Cal App 2d 424, 427, 244 P2d 757 (1952).
21 Id.
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3. Publishers.
Any original media source may be considered a publisher.22
Publishers include newspapers, magazines, television networks,
and individual television and radio stations.23 While publishers
are theoretically held to a negligence "knew or should have
known" standard, given the editorial process at traditional pub-
lishers, a publisher rarely does not "know" an item's content.24
Magazines and newspapers, as well as the authors of individual
articles, are held liable for defamatory statements they pub-
lish.25
The rationale behind this rule is that a publisher has full
control over the information published.2" An agent of the pub-
lisher often edits every word prior to publication. Editors choose
what items to publish, in what form, and using what words.
Concurrent with other factors, editors weigh defamation consider-
ations in determining what information to publish.
Two possible rules may be gleaned from these classifications.
First, and most obviously, the more discretion exercised by an
information disseminator, the higher the standard of care re-
quired to avoid liability.27 Second, the law holds an information
disseminator to the highest standard of care feasible in light of
its operating methods.
B. Distinguishing BBSs from Traditional In-
formation Disseminators
None of the preceding designations adequately captures the
novel characteristics of electronic bulletin boards. Although simi-
larities exist between BBSs and each of the three traditional
classifications, the differences point to the necessity of a new
standard. Before discussing the current case law and the possible
contours of a new standard of care for BBSs, the inadequacies of
the traditional scheme must be explored.
2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577(1) (1976).
23 Loftus E. Becker, Jr., The Liability of Computer Bulletin Board Operators for
Defamation Posted by Others, 22 Conn L Rev 203, 228 (1989).
24 Id.
2 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 612 (1976). Determination of several liability is
left to the individual states.
21 See Viriginia State Bd of Pharmacy v Virginia Consumer Council, 425 US 748
(1976).
27 Joseph P. Thornton, Gary G. Gerlach, and Richard L. Gibson, Legal Issues in
Electronic Publishing: Libel, 36 Fed Comm IU 178, 180 (1984).
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1. Common carriers.
The common carrier classification is both intuitively and
practically unworkable. For the same reasons that traditional
bulletin boards have been held to a higher standard of care (neg-
ligence) than common carriers (actual knowledge), it would be
inappropriate to classify BBSs as common carriers. Both tradi-
tional and electronic bulletin boards allow anyone with access to
the board to post a message to a relatively indeterminate audi-
ence. Private, one-on-one messages are impossible in such a set-
ting-a setting which virtually assures that any message posted
will be read by the entire community using the bulletin board. As
such, a single message posted on a BBS can inflict far more dam-
age than a discreet message from one individual to another. In
the common carrier setting, once the libelous message is trans-
mitted, the damage is complete. No subsequent steps are neces-
sary to rectify any on-going harm because no on-going harm
exists. In the case of the BBS, however, the harm is continual
and potentially extended.2" The longer a message lingers on a
BBS, the more people are likely to read it, thus increasing the
harm done to the defamed individual.2"
Although common carrier status requires the lowest stan-
dard of care, most BBS operators do not wish to be classified as
common carriers due to cost concerns.3" To achieve common car-
rier status, a BBS would have to conform with a welter of FCC
regulations.31 The effort of complying with such regulations ap-
parently outweighs the potential benefits, even for such commer-
cial giants as CompuServe and Prodigy, which could feasibly
comply with the regulations. Neither company, in various court
battles, has ever argued that its BBS services should be classified
as common carriers. 2 As for the smaller systems, (which com-
prise the vast majority of BBSs), an attempt to force their system
Although the duration of a message on a BBS is variable, in almost all cases the
message will linger longer than will a common carrier transmission.
9 Although some would argue that anyone could download the message, copy, and
redistribute it, this assertion does not prevent the above characterization. The same could
be said for anyone with a telephone and a tape recorder. Such incidents are very rare, and
logic has long ago dictated that this possibility is one that can be safely ignored for the
purposes of liability classification.
30 Rex S. Heinke and Heather D. Rafter, Rough Justice in Cyberspace: Liability on the
Electronic Frontier, 11:7 Computer Lawyer 1 (July 1994) (quoting an interview with Kent
Stucky, general counsel of CompuServe).
See, for example, 47 USC §§ 201-27 (1994) and 47 CFR §§ 20-69 (1994).
32 Cubby, Inc. v CompuServe, Inc., 776 F Supp 135, 138 (SD NY 1991); Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v Prodigy Services Co., 1995 NY Misc LEXIS 229 (NY SCt 1995).
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operators to conform to FCC common carrier regulations would
shut down virtually all of them;" the smaller operations simply
do not have the resources to tailor their systems to common car-
rier standards.'
2. Publishers.
The publisher classification also fails to fit BBSs. Traditional
publishers review, edit, and delete portions of items submitted to
them by individuals or groups. Because this review process is
presumed to be informed and thoughtful, publishers are held to a
high standard of care when a libelous item slips through their
net.3" This is not an undue burden to place on traditional pub-
lishers because even absent liability concerns, they would con-
duct this conscientious editorial process for quality-control pur-
poses. Requiring the additional task of proofing items for defama-
tory content adds only a small marginal cost.
In the same vein, there are fundamental differences between
traditional publishers and BBS operators. A traditional publisher
receives far more material than he may profitably publish. Pub-
lishers must therefore decline to publish most of the information
they receive. The costs of publication, as well as the inherent
time and space constraints of traditional media, have created a
bottleneck that hinders the dissemination of information. In
popular literature, one of the often-touted benefits of BBSs, the
Internet, and cyberspace generally is the low marginal cost of
disseminating information. If a choice is made to designate BBS
operators as publishers, not only will overall costs increase enor-
mously due to the additional costs associated with editorial con-
trol exercised, but the rapid and voluminous exchange of ideas
now possible will again be slowed for editorial purposes.
Another historical reason for holding publishers to such a
high standard of care is the fact that they control what the public
sees.36 Limited space leads to limited information, which creates
an unavoidable bias. The particular rules of libel arose to coun-
teract the problems inherant in having the fountains of informa-
" David J. Conner, Cubby v. CompuServe, Defamation Law on the Electronic Fron-
tier, 2 Geo Mason Independent L Rev 227 (1993) (cited in note 2).
' To begin running a BBS one needs only a computer, a modem, and a phone line.
This allows many individuals of moderate means to operate BBSs. See, Melinda Gipson, On-
Line Services United for Competitive Clout, Electronic Media 14 (Sept 6, 1993).
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581 (1976).
See State Bd of Pharmacy, 425 US at 765; Ben H. Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly
(Boston Press, 1992).
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tion in the hands of a few publishers. 7 There are, however, tens
of thousands of BBSs with theoretically unlimited space.3" The
original difficulty of limited information has been eliminated, so
there is no longer any reason to apply an inappropriate and out-
dated rule to the new technology of electronic bulletin boards.
3. Secondary publishers.
Classifying BBSs as secondary publishers offers the most
promising possibility of the three traditional categories. Yet even
this classification is inappropriate given the novel nature of the
BBS. Unlike plaintiffs suing a traditional publisher, individuals
defamed by messages on a BBS would likely find the defendants
relatively judgment proof.39 That is, the only persons liable for
damages would be the originator of the message and the system
operator ("sysop"). Most sysops could neither afford to pay a large
damage award nor afford insurance against such an eventuali-
ty.4° Unlike the case of a newsstand or library, there is no pri-
mary publisher to reach in the case of a BBS defamation suit.
Publishers are usually "deep pockets" with sufficient assets to
cover a damage award or to secure insurance against such
awards. A defamed party might be able to collect against a large
publisher, but would probably fail to recover substantial damages
against a small system operator.
A difference of type exists between libraries and BBSs given
the control each institution has over its inventory of information.
Libraries choose the items stocked on their shelves. If a library
removes a book on account of libelous content, that item will
likely never reappear on the shelves. Problems can be handled in
a reasonably short time, and the particular difficulty should not
recur. On a BBS, however, either the original sender or any other
subscriber who has downloaded the defamatory message could
immediately repost a message which had been previously re-
moved by the system operator. To ask a BBS operator continually
to remove previously-deleted postings or somehow to prevent
such postings from reappearing is to impose additional burdens
37 Id.
' Conner, 2 Geo Mason Independent L Rev at 229 (cited in note 2).
3' For similar reasons, secondary publishers are rarely sued in light of the (usually)
deeper pockets of a publisher.
40 Most BBSs are run by individual hobbyists who could not satisfy a large award or
would find the cost of insurance prohibitive. Conner, 2 Geo Mason Independent L Rev at
226 (cited in note 2). This idea was articulated in the telegraph context in O'Brien, 113
F2d at 542.
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not incumbent on a library, thus collapsing the secondary pub-
lisher analogy.
The final factor against adopting the library or secondary
publisher analogy is the paucity of law on secondary publishers.
For example, no one appears to have sued a public library in this
century.41 Although the horn book and Restatement rules ap-
pear relatively clear, courts have been reluctant to impose liabili-
ty on secondary publishers.42 Since the courts would be forced to
reinterpret the "library" rule in any event, drawing torturous
analogies to old situations never adequately explored, there is no
reason why a clear rule should not be created and enforced. A
new doctrine would refocus the law on the fairness and efficiency
concerns contemplated in formulating the traditional media law
without forcing the courts to squeeze a new situation into an old
rule.
C. Attempts to Classify BBSs
In recent years, courts have issued two opinions addressing
the specific issue of BBS sysop defamation liability.43 Both cases
have factual idiosyncrasies which preclude their widespread
adoption as the paradigm for a new standard, but the courts in
both cases grappled with the same issues dealt with above. As
will be discussed below, neither court provided an adequate guide
for future decisionmaking.
In Cubby, Inc. v CompuServe Inc., the court held that
CompuServe, through its BBSs, was a distributor rather than a
publisher of information." The lack of a clearly articulated test,
however, will hinder the future applicability of Cubby.
For a membership fee and online usage fees, CompuServe
provides its customers with access to over 150 special interest
"forums," comprised of electronic bulletin boards, interactive
online conferences, and topical databases.45 The forum at issue
Becker, 22 Conn L Rev at 227 (cited in note 23).
42 Id at 226-27.
"' Aside from Cubby, 776 F Supp 135, and Stratton, 1995 NY Misc LEXIS 229, other
BBS defamation actions include Hagler v Proctor & Gamble, Civil Action No. 069400012
(101st D Ct Tex) (award of $15 million under appeal); Medphone v Denigris, Civil Action
No. 92-3785 (D NJ 1992) (defamation action, now settled) (cited in S. Lieberman and J.
Kutler, Defamation Claims in Cyberspace, Libel Defense Resource Center Newsletter, May
1994).
Cubby, 776 F Supp at 140-41. The terms "distributor" and "secondary publisher"
are interchangeable for the purposes of this Comment.
' Id at 137.
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in Cubby was the Journalism Forum. CompuServe had contract-
ed with Cameron Communications to independently "manage,
review, create, delete, edit and otherwise control the contents" of
the Journalism Forum.4 One of the publications available was
"Rumorville," which was contractually furnished to Cameron by a
third party, Don Fitzpatrick Associates.47 CompuServe had no
direct contract with Don Fitzpatrick, and CompuServe did not
have the opportunity to review the content of Rumorville before it
was posted on the Journalism Forum. The plaintiff, Cubby, main-
tained that Rumorville published defamatory remarks about his
fledgling online publication, "Skuttlebut." Cubby then sued both
Fitzpatrick and CompuServe for libel."
The court held that CompuServe was a distributor of the
information and was therefore held to the secondary publisher's
standard of knew or should have known.49 The court based its
decision on the theory that CompuServe's electronic forums were
essentially like a "for-profit library," and therefore a secondary
publisher under the reasoning of Smith v California.° The
Smith court noted that it was unreasonable to expect that a
bookseller would know the contents of every book in his store or
library."' Not only would this call for omniscience on the part of
the bookseller, but it would also unduly restrict the public's ac-
cess to reading materials, and perhaps, violate the First Amend-
ment.52 The Cubby court further noted that "CompuServe has no
more editorial control over such a publication than does a public
library, book store, or newsstand, and it would be no more feasi-
ble for CompuServe to examine every publication it carries for
potentially defamatory statements than it would be for any other
distributor to do so."" Finally, the court seemed to find signifi-
cant that another company, completely unrelated to CompuServe,
managed the publication at issue.54
The other case directly addressing this issue is Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v Prodigy Services Co.55 In Stratton, the court
46. Id.
47 Id.
" Cubby, 776 F Supp at 138.
'9 Id at 140.
5 Smith v California, 361 US at 147.
5' Id at 153.
52 Id.
Cubby, 776 F Supp at 140.
' Id. Unfortunately, Cameron Communications was not joined as a defendant in this
case, and the court did not address the issue of Cameron's potential liability.
' Stratton, 1995 NY Misc LEXIS 229.
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ultimately held Prodigy to a publisher's standard of care due to
Prodigy's editorial control over the contents of its bulletin
boards.58 Prodigy argued that it was impossible manually to con-
trol some 60,000 messages posted each day on Prodigy bulletin
boards, and that only duty of the "Board Leaders" was to remove
objectionable material brought to their attention. The court, how-
ever, ruled that through public statements, "Prodigy held itself
out to the public and its members as controlling the content of its
computer bulletin boards [and] implemented this control through
its automatic software screening program, and the Guidelines
which Board Leaders are required to enforce."57 The court
summed up its argument as follows:
It is Prodigy's own policies ... which have altered the
scenario (of Cubby) and mandated the finding that it is
a publisher. Prodigy's conscious choice, to gain the bene-
fits of editorial control, has opened it up to a greater
liability than CompuServe and other computer net-
works that make no such choice.58
The court also reasoned that this ruling would not necessarily
lead all computer bulletin boards to eschew editorial controls
because there was a certain "family-oriented" niche of the market
that would value such control.59
There are no major logical leaps in either the Cubby or
Stratton decision. It is reasonable to view CompuServe as an
electronic for-profit library, although as outlined above, this anal-
ogy has its limits. Similarly, the court's reasoning in Stratton
was sound. Although a jury probably should have made the factu-
al determination of publisher status, the court's reasoning pro-
cess is not obviously erroneous.
Nor is there anything particularly disturbing in the fact that
the two cases reached different conclusions. The factual differenc-
es in the cases made probable a divergence of opinion. Far more
problematic is the lack of a uniform standard by which to adjudi-
cate such cases.
Concerns over editorial control exercised by the sysop fac-
tored heavily in each decision. The Cubby court reasoned that it
'6 Id at 13-14.
" Id at 10.
58 Id at 13. The court did not elaborate what these "benefits of control" might be.
Presumably, the benefit would be the retention of subscribers who might leave the net-
work if certain items were allowed to be posted.
"' Stratton, 1995 NY Misc LEXIS 229 at 13.
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was impossible for a sysop to exercise traditional editorial control
over messages given the sheer volume of postings each day. ° In
essence, the court excused CompuServe from any editorial du-
ties."' The Stratton court altered Cubby's logic to read "excused
from any involuntary editorial duties." Once a representation of
editorial control was made or attempted by Prodigy, Prodigy
shouldered a duty to insure that its information network did not
carry defamatory messages."
Although the court scrutinized editorial control in each case,
the two courts clearly differed in their approach to the issue and
in the amount of weight this issue should carry in the decision-
making process. The courts neither formulated nor followed any
clear test in spite of their analyses of editorial control and of
various possible contributing factors. 3 The divergent reasoning
in these cases provides the most vivid illustration of the need for
a uniform standard of care. If courts cannot agree on what meth-
ods to use in deciding cases, all predictability ceases; even similar
fact patterns could result in different decisions. Rather than
continuing with the present muddle, courts should simply adopt
an "editorial control" test, thus restoring some measure of pre-
dictability." Such a solution, however, would not be wholly sat-
isfactory and would ultimately be self-defeating.
As articulated above, use of the Cubby standard is unaccept-
able since defamed parties might have no legal redress at all.
Additionally, Cubby offers little insight into how to solve the
present situation, given that the court simply let CompuServe off
the hook.
The Stratton decision offers a more clearly-articulated test,
providing a better starting point for a prospective discussion, but
not reaching a final conclusion. Using the logic of Stratton, liabil-
ity will lie if a certain (as yet undetermined) amount of editorial
' Cubby, 776 F Supp at 140. The Prodigy online service receives approximately
60,000 messages each day. Stratton, 1995 NY Misc LEXIS 229 at 8.
Cubby, 776 F Supp at 140.
62 Stratton, 1995 NY Misc LEXIS 229 at 13.
'3 Cubby, 776 F Supp at 135.
For a good discussion on the benefits of predictibility in law, see Richard A. Posner,
The Economic Approach to Law, 53 Tex L Rev 757 (1975); Paul H. Rubin, Predictability
and the Economic Approach to Law: A Comment on Rizzo, 9 J Legal Stud 319 (1980). The
presumption that predictability is beneficial underlies most law and economics argu-
ments. See Daniel T. Ostas and Burt A. Leete, Economic Analysis of Law as a Guide to
Post-Communist Legal Reforms: The Case of Hungarian Contract Law, 32 Am Bus L J
355, 394 (1995).
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control is exercised or claimed.65 At least two difficulties, howev-
er, arise from such a test. The first is a line-drawing problem:
how much editorial control is enough to trigger the type of liabili-
ty imposed on Prodigy? Presumably, the screening of every in-
coming message for defamation would be labeled editorial con-
trol, but where does one draw the line? Is the use of "George
Carlin" software enough?" Or the use of software designed to
look for proper names, so editors could manually screen those
postings? Alternatively, assume an individual has repeatedly
posted lewd comments on the BBS. If the sysop removed the
offender from the subscriber list, would this constitute editorial
control? Without answers to each of these questions, and with
few analogous common law guidelines, an "editorial control"
standard would create more problems than it would solve.
The second disturbing aspect of a simple editorial control
test stems from the impact such a test would have on market
choices, as its uncertainty would limit the flexibility sysops have
in choosing a level of editorial control. Under the Stratton court's
reasoning, BBSs could avoid liability by refraining from any form
of editorial control.67 The court believed that the market would
create a niche for "family-oriented" services that exercise editori-
al control over their BBSs to insure the purity of their postings.
If people are willing to pay the higher rates caused by the ex-
pense of editorial control, then such a service would be provid-
ed.68 There is no reason, however, to force "family-oriented" ser-
vices to charge higher rates since certain software provides a
fairly simple and inexpensive means of exercising a modicum of
editorial control.
For example, a certain segment of the population would
prefer not to have messages containing profanity posted on the
BBSs to which they subscribe. Of course, on an open BBS, any-
one could post an obscene or profane message. Using the Stratton
logic, it is possible that if a sysop were to screen incoming mes-
sages for profanity, he would have exercised editorial control,
thus making himself potentially liable. Even though this screen-
ing could be accomplished by using very simple, low-cost software
Stratton, 1995 NY Misc LEXIS 229 at 9.
" 'George Carlin" software, so named for Carlin's "7 Words You Can't Use on Radio"
comedy routine, allows a sysop to remove or "screen out" messages containing certain
words, usually profanity. See Peter H. Lewis, "Censors Become a Force on Cyberspace
Frontier," Dallas Morning News 2D (June 29, 1994).
67 Stratton, 1995 NY Misc LEXIS 229 at 12-14.
" Id at 13.
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without any manual interference, the sysop would have become
as much a publisher as the Rand-McNally corporation.
To illustrate the foolishness of such a state of affairs, imag-
ine a bookstore owner who chooses not to carry Playboy. At virtu-
ally no cost, the store exercises a form of editorial control that is
assumed to be agreeable to at least some of its customers. 9 It
cannot, however, be argued that an anti-Playboy decision means
that every book in the store will be unobjectionable to everyone.
A superficial screening of a single publication cannot hope to rid
the store of all objectionable material. Although a bookstore
would not be liable under common-law "secondary publisher"
status, this is the logic that the Stratton court used to find Prodi-
gy liable. Under Stratton, sysops might fear that preventing
certain obviously offensive messages from being posted would
trigger "publisher" liability, thus leading them to decline to exer-
cise even minimal editorial control. There is no reason that
sysops should not exercise minimal control in some circumstances
and thereby provide more market choices. The law should not
inhibit such behavior.
Even with the "simple" editorial control standard, therefore,
uncomfortable situations will arise, and courts will have to draw
new legal lines for the rule to make sense in all circumstances.
Rather than attempt to jury-rig an outmoded categorization
scheme to accommodate BBSs, a new standard of care tailored
specifically to BBSs should be created. Using ideas and logic
borrowed from each of the traditional classifications, a new clas-
sification can be built around the new technology.7 °
II. A NEW STANDARD-OF-CARE CLASSIFICATION
A. Prior Attempts to Classify BBSs
As might be imagined, various commentators have addressed
the possibility of a new classification.71 These articles, however,
69 Although such a decision would probably alienate the Playboy-purchasing crowd,
the extremely low administrative costs of the decision allow the bookseller to make his
own decisions without fearing that a customer offended by a Demi Moore Vanity Fair
cover might bring suit.
'o There is historical precedence for creating new classifications around new technolo-
gies. See generally Anthony J. Sassan, Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc.: Comparing Apples
to Oranges: The Need for a New Media Classification, 5 Software L J 821 (1992).
" See, for example, id; Rex S. Heinke and Heather D. Rafter, Rough Justice in
Cyberspace: Liability on the Electronic Frontier, 11:7 Computer Lawyer 1 (July 1994) (cit-
ed in note 30); Loftus E. Becker, Jr., The Liability of Computer Bulletin Board Operators
for Defamation Posted by Others, 22 Conn L Rev 203 (1989) (cited in note 23); and David
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were written prior to the Stratton case, which cast a new light on
the entire enterprise.
Robert Charles articulated the most comprehensive scheme
in a 1987 article." Charles argues that, in some circumstances,
sysops should be liable for statements made on their BBSs. 7' A
specifically-tailored negligence system, a "reasonable systems
operator" standard, lies at the heart of Charles's suggestions.74
In support of this standard, Charles lists some specific examples
of negligent acts that would trigger liability.75 First, a sysop
would have a duty to establish an identification code system,
thereby allowing the defamed party to identify the originator of
the libelous remark.76 Second, a sysop must warn subscribers of
their twin duties not to post libelous material and to inform the
system operator if any such material is found on the BBS.
7
Third, a sysop would have a duty to inspect, within a reasonable
time, all messages posted.78 Finally, a sysop would be required
to remove material he knew or had reason to know was defama-
tory.79 Under Charles's scheme, if a sysop failed to fulfill any of
the four duties, the sysop would be liable.
Charles's underlying assumption is that expectations of pri-
vacy are considerably diminished in the realm of the BBS.8 °
Whereas an individual expects that his telephone conversations
will remain private, there is no such expectation when posting a
message on a BBS. Since there is no privacy expectation on a
BBS, individuals should not care if a fellow subscriber or an
editor reads their messages.8 ' Some form of editorial control by
a sysop should therefore be neither unexpected nor particularly
onerous to BBS users. Although some users might object, if they
truly wish their communications to remain uncensored, they
must use a common carrier. 2
0
J. Conner, Cubby v. CompuServe, Defamation Law on the Electronic Frontier, 2 Geo
Mason Independent L Rev 227 (1993) (cited in note 2).
72 Robert J. Charles, Computer Bulletin Boards and Defamation: Who Should be
Liable? Under What Standard?, 2 J L & Tech 121, 146-149 (1987) (cited in note 11).
" Id at 147.
74 Id.
75 Id.
71 Charles, 2 J L & Tech at 147. Under Charles's proposal, each message or posting
would be identified by a code known only to the sysop. Pseudonyms could still be used,
but in the event of a libelous posting, an anonymous author could be identified.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
' Charles, 2 J L & Tech 121 at 143.
8' Id.
82 For a good first look at privacy expectations in cyberspace, see Lawrence Lessig,
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Charles's first suggestion, that the BBS be required to insti-
tute an identification system, is generally reasonable. The cost to
a system operator would be minimal, involving only the adminis-
trative costs of assigning codes to each subscriber. 3 Individuals
could still appear anonymously on the bulletin board, with only
the system operator knowing which identification codes accompa-
ny which pseudonyms or names.84 In the event of a defamation
action, sysops would be required to disclose the identity of the
person making an anonymous defamatory statement. This would
allow defamed persons to reach the originator of the libelous
message and impose no liability on the sysop personally.
One difficulty with such an identification system is the fact
that cyberspace has always been characterized by the possibility
of anonymity. The knowledge that a list of identification codes is
stored somewhere in a system operator's computer could inhibit
free exchange of information and ideas.8 5 Enforcement of such a
rule also presents difficulties discussed below.
Charles's second suggestion involves a duty to warn subscrib-
ers not to post defamatory material, coupled with a plea for sub-
scribers to report any such postings to the system operator.86
This warning would serve as notification to subscribers and as a
thin screen or deterrent to defamatory material.
This suggestion, too, seems reasonable. It may not, however,
be very effective. Such a warning or admonition could be quickly
ignored. Like the warnings on cigarette packages, a BBS warning
of this type would become routine and would exert no impact on
the subscriber after a few viewings."7 By itself, however, this
consideration should not prevent such a warning, however inef-
fectual, from being posted. If the costs of-adding such a warning
The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 Yale L J 1743 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment
in Cyberspace, 104 Yale L J 1757 (1995).
' With computer support, administrative costs would occur only in generating and
updating subscriber lists. Each time an individual posted a message, the computer could
automatically make a note of the posting.
Presumably the sysop would be under some duty not to share the identification
codes with others or to inform users that their identities might be shared.
' Lessig, 104 Yale I.J at 1750 (cited in note 82) (discussing the positives and nega-
tives of anonymity and cryptography).
Charles, 2 J L & Tech at 147 (cited in note 11).
17 See, for example, Donald W. Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A
Modest Proposal, 53 S Cal L Rev 1423, 1437 (1980) (questioning the efficacy of warning
labels on cigarettes); S. Hyland and S. Birrell, Government Health Warnings and the
"Boomerang" Effect, 44 Pyschological Rep 643 (1979) (stating that warning labels may at
times increase the use of an item).
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to a welcome screen are negligible and some deterrent effect
could be achieved, no reason exists not to add these warnings.
Charles's third suggestion, however, creates serious difficul-
ties. Charles suggests that sysops should have a duty to inspect
all publicly-posted messages within a reasonable time of their
posting.8 Although not clearly articulated, the surrounding lan-
guage suggests that this inspection would consist of a full, sub-
stantive reading of each message.89 Such a duty imposes a tre-
mendous burden on the system operator. There is no intuitive
difference between such a standard for a sysop and that of a
publisher; each has to read and pass judgment on every piece of
information. Nor is there any real difference between inspecting
all messages "within a reasonable time" and inspecting them
prior to posting. The same number of messages have to be in-
spected, and the same marginal number of messages have to be
inspected each day. Under this regime, a system operator is re-
sponsible, at some point, for every message which appears on his
BBS.
This suggestion also does not make any sense in light of the
other criteria Charles advocates. Clearly, this inspection stan-
dard of care is far higher than that of posting warnings to sub-
scribers. If a sysop is forced to read every message, why should
the law care if the sysop asks the BBS subscribers not to post
such material? If a subscriber ignores the warning and the sysop
fails to catch the defamatory message, presumably the sysop
could sue the poster for indemnification. If full indemnification is
possible, however, it is not clear why the BBS should be involved
at all. If full indemnification is not possible, the preposted warn-
ing does not help the BBS legally.
Charles's final suggestion, that libelous items be removed
when brought to the sysop's attention, deserves a hard look.
While a good idea in theory, there are practical problems which
prevent the institution of such a rule. First, one must worry
about a sysop being forced to decide what constitutes libel. With-
out adequate knowledge or expertise, sysops would have to make
repeated judgment calls on whether or not to remove an item.
Second, if sysops decide to play it safe and simply remove every
reported item, any subscriber could wipe out whole sections of
the BBS or have removed those messages with which he did not
Charles, 2 J L & Tech at 147 (cited in note 11).
89 Id.
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agree-thus destroying any hope of meaningful broad-based com-
munication.
B. A More Workable Standard
Prior attempts to classify BBSs have either failed to address
all of the issues or have combined the wrong ideas in formulating
a solution. A more workable standard would hold BBS sysops to
a standard of care similar to that of a secondary publisher, but
with special adjustments made in light of the technology at issue.
First, it must be underscored that imposing the requirement
that a sysop read every posted message is both unworkable and
undesirable. The sheer volume of messages received prevents an
operator from even beginning such an undertaking." Just as a
library or newsstand staff cannot be expected to read every word
of every item received from the publisher, we cannot impute
omniscience to a BBS operator. Such a system would also be
undesirable as it would call for innumerable judgment calls by
individual BBS operators who have no expertise in libel law. To
hold a lay person liable for failing properly to determine what
constitutes libel is unfair.91 Most system operators begin BBSs
because they are interested in a particular topic and would like
to discuss that topic with others holding similar interests, not to
gain publishing or media experience.92 Additionally, to ask indi-
vidual operators to judge for themselves what constitutes libel
would undoubtedly cause a reduction of information dissemina-
tion. Perfectly innocuous messages would be edited out by
skittish operators, disrupting the flow of ideas and informa-
tion-the flow of which is the purpose of BBSs.93
9 In the case of Prodigy, some 60,000 messages are received every day. While some
smaller BBSs have relatively few postings, reading all of them still takes time. Smaller
operators run BBSs primarily as a hobby, and it would be unfair to ask such sysops to
take considerable time each day to read every message.
"' Courts have agreed with this position as well. In Auvil the court stated that to
"force the creation of full time editorial boards at local stations throughout the country
which possess insufficient knowledge, legal acumen, and access to experts to continually
monitor incoming transmissions and exercise on-the-spot discretionary calls or face $75
million lawsuits at every turn. That is not realistic." Auvil v CBS "60 Minutes", 800 F
Supp 928, 931 (ED Wash 1992). Although defamation suits against small BBSs would
likely be for smaller amounts, the hobbyists running these boards have even less access to
experts and probably less legal acumen.
Comment, Dueling Forums: The Public Forum Doctrine's Failure to Protect the Elec-
tronic Forum, 60 U Cin L Rev 757, 789 (1992).
" Such a rule may also violate the holding of Smith v California, 361 US 147 (1956).
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Although system operators should not be burdened with the
obligation of reading every message, there are technologically
• feasible steps that should be taken to attempt some monitoring.
A combination of identification codes, removal of material to
which subscribers object, and minimal automatic screening proce-
dures would eliminate a significant number of problems for both
the sysop and the defamed party.
First, BBS operators should not be held liable if they keep
accurate identification codes. Identification codes, held only by
the sysop, would allow the defamed party to seek redress from
the individual originating the message. Such a system is merely
the equivalent of current law, whereby a publisher knows the
identity of a statement's originator.94 Presently, the only way an
originator of libel may evade a lawsuit is if a publisher chooses to
publish comments anonymously or pseudonymously.9" In such a
case, the publisher has made a conscious choice to assume lia-
bility for the statement should the comment prove defamatory.
There is, however, a difficulty in administering such an iden-
tification scheme. Without further incentive, there is no reason
that an individual would necessarily give his real name when
identifying himself to the sysop. Of course, large, for-fee services
such as CompuServe and America On-Line keep careful track of
their subscribers for billing purposes. Smaller sysops, however,
running their BBSs for free, have no real incentive to insure the
veracity of identifying statements made by their subscribers. To
insure a defamed individual the capability of reaching the
originator of a libelous message, an incentive must be created.
The most obvious and least intrusive incentive is to hold
BBS sysops liable in defamation actions if they cannot provide
accurate information regarding the identity of those posting mes-
sages. Similar to a publisher, sysops could choose for themselves
whether identification codes were "worth it," and if sysops chose
not to keep such codes, they would be liable for defamatory
postings. While the administrative costs of keeping accurate
records are not negligible, they can be minimized if courts ac-
knowledge that reasonable efforts to ensure accuracy will allow
the sysop to escape liability.96
'" Witness, for example, that most newspapers will not publish anonymous letters to
the editor.
" That is, if a publisher disseminates information without knowing its source, the
publisher may be liable in a defamation action.
Reasonable efforts might include such simple acts as requiring a credit card
number that can be checked with the issuing company, or requiring a home phone num-
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In addition to keeping identification codes, sysops should also
be obligated to remove material about which subscribers com-
plain. To correct the over-inclusiveness of Charles's fourth sug-
gestion, such an obligation should attach only when the person
allegedly being libeled or his agent complains. This solution will
minimize the concerns regarding sysops making personal judg-
ments about what constitutes libel. If BBS operators were under
a duty to inspect or remove any item complained of for reasons of
libel, many more decisions would have to be made by the system
operator, and a single complaint by any random subscriber could
wipe out whole sections of the bulletin board or specific ideas
posted by others. If the potential plaintiff finds nothing objection-
able in the statement, it should not be removed. Acting on a
complaint by the individual allegedly being libeled allows the
sysop to minimize the damage without the huge cost of actively
prescreening all messages. This is the most cost-effective solution
even though a small amount of harm is allowed in order to spare
massive costs. 7
The most important part of any future standard of care is
not a duty, but an option. The law should allow for minimal
screening procedures that do not trigger full-blown publisher
liability. Use of a screening program that seeks and excises pro-
fanity should not constitute editorial control in the traditional
sense. Traditional classifications did not have to take into ac-
count the possibility that a library or newsstand could, to some
degree, search out certain objectionable phrases and excise them.
Since new technology is available, there is no reason not to use
it, especially in the field for which it was designed. Screening for
profanity has nothing to do with protecting individuals from
defamation and cannot be considered editorial control for libel
purposes.
This clear line is far better than the present system.9 8 With
a bright-line rule, actors could consciously choose to place them-
selves in one category or another. A reasonable line, however,
would be the involvement of human judgment. But the use of
computer software, however sophisticated, would not trigger
publisher-type liability.
ber that the sysop can call. Of course, sysops would also have the ability to keep unidenti-
fied or unverified persons off their BBS and to remove subscribers whose information
turned out to be false.
" The small harm allowed is the initial, brief publication of the libel. This solution
eliminates, however, the potential for libelous messages to linger on the BBS.
" See note 63 and accompanying text. Clear lines are necessary for predictability.
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This system would not only prevent humans from having to
make judgment calls, it would also serve to provide almost per-
fect notice to all subscribers of the BBS. Because computer pro-
grams run perfectly logically, in theory the ground rules would be
established, explained, and equally applicable to all messages. An
individual could choose to subscribe to a BBS based on the level
of screening software used, thus duplicating the Stratton court's
"niche market" without forcing the heaviest liability regime on
actors taking only minimal control steps.
CONCLUSION
If new technologies are to survive in the years ahead, rules
must be created to govern them. Without such rules, fledgling
industries will be unable to make informed decisions concerning
the legal operation of their enterprises. As long as new rules are
being formulated, however, rules specific to the new institutions
ought to be created, rather than attempting to force cyberspace
into a legal regime created for the print and broadcast media.
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